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_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: Background. The Danish National Board of Health is implementing the International 
Classificatin for Patient Safety (ICPS) in the national reporting system (ICPS-DK). Study objective. Test the 
usability of ICPS-DK consisting of 29 non-exclusive categories and to incorporate amendments to the 
system before final launch. The present paper aims to disseminate results about usability aspects of the ICPS. 
Design. Data about usability aspects collected via questionnaire and written comments from a reliability test. 
Setting. Sixty-five risk managers made optional written comments while classifying 58 selected reports, of 
which 56 participants subsequently completed a questionnaire about the usability of ICPS-DK and problems 
with specific incident types. Participants. Thirty-three respondents from units with experience with the 
previous reporting system, and 32 respondents representing new users outside the hospitals. Main outcome 
measure(s). Ease of use, identification of problematic incident types, and verbal specification of problems. 
Results. Participants were neutral (46 %) or found it (fairly) easy to use (49 %). Difficulties with 
distinguishing Administrative Processes from Clinical Processes, and some problems with individual 
subtypes. Communication and Documentation and Resources and Organisation perceived as very broad and 
needing specification. Some participants concerned about non-exclusive categories leading to excessive use 
of types for individual reports. Conclusions. Although ICPS-DK is comprehensive, few respondents found it 
difficult to use. The authors recommend a simple adaptation of ICPS with incident types, which may be 
expanded to include systemic factors. Excessive use of certain types reducible by specification and avoiding 
speculation about causes not explicitly contained in incident report.  
Keywords: Incident reporting, Patient safety, Taxonomy, Organizational factors 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Danish national reporting system for patient safety events, which was the first nationwide, mandatory 
and non-punitive reporting system in healthcare, was launched in January 2004 to support learning from the 
reporting of adverse events occurring in the hospital sector. Since its introduction, the number of reports has 
grown every year, from 5,000 in 2004 to 34,000 in 2010 [1].  Adverse events in the first version were 
classified into nine incident types.   
With the introduction of a more comprehensive reporting system (introduced September 2010) the National 
Board of Health decided to adapt the WHO International Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) [2-5] for 
the classification of incident types. The Danish adaptation of ICPS (hence forth referred to as ICPS-DK) was 
intended to be as close to the original ICPS as to allow international comparison while at the same time be 
more manageable and time efficient in the everyday classification of incidents. Reporting of incidents to the 
new system has been extended to include general practitioners, municipal healthcare (home care, nursing 
homes), dentistry and other specialist clinics; and later, patients and their relatives [6]. Incidents are first 
reported by a healthcare person often directly involved submitting a written description, and these reports are 
later to be classified by another person more familiar with patient safety issues, e.g. a risk manager in a 
hospital.  
  
 
 
It was decided by the National Board of Health that the ICPS-DK should be divided into a core of incident 
types into which all incidents must be classified (the mandatory part) and a more extensive part (the optional 
part) intended for reports that describe serious incidents, which typically contain greater descriptive 
specification, and/or events where the learning potential is particularly large.  
2 OBJECTIVE 
This paper aims to describe the Danish adaptation of the ICPS, report the results of a usability test of that 
adaptation and discuss the possible implications for the further development of the ICPS. At the same time, a 
parallel paper reports on results of a reliability test of the mandatory part of ICPS-DK [7]. The present paper 
focuses mainly on issues that have relevance for the general application of the ICPS, rather than those issues 
that are specific to the Danish context and implementation. 
Readers considering implementation of ICPS in other countries may be interested in learning from the 
Danish experience with a selective adaptation. The ICPS in total is extensive, and others will probably 
consider some form of selective adaptation in order to facilitate a reporting process with a reasonable use of 
resources, while providing useful information for further analysis. ICPS-DK represents some suggestions for 
a partial implementation, while the usability study explores problems and advantages with that adaptation. 
Some of the most significant elements of the adaptation are presented in the next section, but can be 
summarized as: no separate classification of contributing factors, no separate indication of problems, and 
only indication of processes for a few incident types, and the expansion of the incident type ‘Documentation’ 
to include communication. 
3 ADAPTATION OF THE ICPS 
The World Health Organization’s World Alliance has developed the ICPS in order to establish “a common 
format to facilitate aggregation, analysis and learning across disciplines, borders and time” [8]. While the 
ICPS consists of ten high level classes, including Incident Type, Patient Outcomes, Detection and 
Contributing Factors/Hazards, ICPS-DK is based on only one of these [2;4], viz. Incident types.  
In the mandatory ICPS-DK it is sufficient to use the incident type for most of the 13 types, since this 
information will be adequate for a minimal classification. Four incident types require further specification by 
the user (see Table 1). When classifying an incident into 1.Administrative processes or 2.Clinical processes a 
user is thus required to further indicate the relevant specific type of process where the problem occurred, e.g. 
a Handover… or Diagnosis. This specification should make it possible to distinguish 1.Administrative 
processes from other incident types such as 2.Clinical processes and 12.Resources and organization. 
Similarly, 2.Clinical processes requires a more detailed classification by indicating specific processes, since 
it encompasses the majority of critical healthcare processes and would otherwise be too broad to provide 
meaningful information. Two other incident types, 9.Self-harm… and 10.Patient accident, also require 
specification by subtypes. 
ICPS-DK has not implemented the separate class for Contributing factors from the original ICPS and does 
therefore not offer a separate class for indication of causes. Instead, some incident types can be used to 
include indicate factors, e.g. organizational factors may be indicated by incident type Resources and 
Organization, and one human factor – communication – is covered by the modified incident type Healthcare 
communication and documentation. This use has required some modification of the original ICPS types by 
expanding them to include circumstances or conditions that “can not be incidents in their own right” [2]. In 
particular, Resources and organization in ICPS is intended for only occasional failures such as a short and 
non-recurring staff shortage, power failure, etc., while the corresponding type in ICPS-DK has been defined 
to include also so-called systemic causes [9] or latent conditions such as recurring staff shortages, poor 
maintenance of equipment, poor or lacking procedure  etc. [10]. 
The ICPS type for problems Documentation has also been expanded significantly in ICPS-DK to include a 
broader set of incidents that involve, e.g., misunderstandings or communication failures between health care 
  
 
 
providers. The expanded type Healthcare communication and documentation thus includes communication 
problems that are often treated as ‘contributing factors’, e.g. as human (Staff and Patient) factors in ICPS, 
and it can now be used to indicate factors in a broad range of incidents. With this definition, documentation 
is treated as a means of communication, and documentation problems are treated as a subclass of a much 
broader category of communication problems.  
Table 1. Incident types and subtypes with number of comments during the test. 
INCIDENT TYPE COMMENTS 
1. Administrative processes 44 
Handovers/ shift changes/sector changes/ Referral 12 
Appointment  
Waiting list/ waiting time/ continuity gap 22 
Admissions/reception 3 
Discharge  
Patient identification  
Informed consent  
Other/not known  
2. Clinical processes 28 
Screening/Prevention/Routine Checkup 8 
Diagnosis/examination/assessment 4 
Treatment/intervention/monitoring 4 
Care/rehabilitation 3 
Test/survey/test results 4 
Detention/fixation 4 
Other/not known  
3. Professional communication and documentation 14 
4. Medication 6 
5. Medical equipment 3 
6. Infection  2 
7. Blood and blood components 0 
8. Gases and air for medical use 0 
9. Self-harm, suicide attempts or suicide 5 
Self-harm  
Suicide attempt  
Suicide  
10. Patient accident 1 
Fall  
Other  
11. Buildings and infrastructure  3 
12. Resources and organisation 16 
13. Other incident type  
Classification based on ICPS-DK is non-exclusive in the sense that one case may involve more than one 
incident type, whether because a report describes several incidents, or to describe causes implied in the 
report. ICPS-DK is thus non-exclusive both in accordance with the definitions in ICPS and to allow an 
indication of causes without a separate structure for ‘contributing factors’, and at this point it differs from the 
previous reporting system, which required classification into only one of seven exclusive categories. Yet, 
  
 
 
classification should be limited to the text submitted by the reporter, without indicating incident types based 
on speculation beyond the description, e.g. about possible organizational causes. 
4 METHODS AND MATERIALS 
The pilot test of the ICPS-DK consisted of a reliability test and a questionnaire. The usability test described 
in this paper comprises users’ written comments made during the reliability test and the results from the 
questionnaire survey. 
Fifty-eight test cases were selected to ensure that each of the 29 incident types would be represented by two 
cases. The logic of non-exclusive categorization implies that several of the cases might also involve one or 
more additional incident types. A user guide instructed raters to use as many different incident types and 
subtypes as warranted by the case description and to avoid speculation beyond what is stated in the target 
report. 
A total of 91 participants were selected from the various professional groups that will be using the reporting 
system in the future. Forty-three participants were invited from the somatic disciplines at the hospitals, which 
were already familiar with the previous version of the reporting system. Twenty-six were invited from other 
hospital groups not previously included in the reporting system: psychiatry, ambulance and therapists. 
Outside the hospital sector 17 were invited from the municipalities responsible for nursing homes and other 
facilities, and 5 general practitioners. 
A list of the 29 types and subtypes (the taxonomy comprising the mandatory part) with a user guide and test 
cases were sent to participants in March 2010, with ten days to respond. Participants were invited to write 
comments when classifying a case. After two reminder e-mails to non-responders, 65 raters returned their 
responses (response rate = 71%).  
After completion of the pilot test, respondents received an electronic questionnaire asking them to: 1) rate the 
ease or difficulty of using the classification; 2) rate their own prior experience with classifying incidents, 3) 
indicate particularly difficult incident types; 4) describe problems with incomprehensibility or lack of clarity 
in the classification. The first three were Likert-style items, the last an open textual response item. Responses 
were received from 56 of the 65 raters (response rate = 86%). 
5 RESULTS 
50 % of respondents had much experience with classifying incidents, 16 % had some experience, while 34 % 
had no experience. In general, participants were neutral or moderately positive about the ease of using the 
classification, while only 5 % found it difficult to use (Table 2).  
Table 2. How easy or difficult is it to use the classification? 
N=56 % n 
Very easy 4 2 
Fairly easy 45 25 
Neutral 46 26 
Fairly difficult 5 3 
Very difficult 0 0 
Raters indicated five incident types as particularly difficult (Table 3, showing types indicated by more than 3 
raters), and four of these can also be identified as critical based on the number written comments from the 
reliability test (Table 1): Administrative processes, Clinical processes, Healthcare communication and 
documentation and Resources and organization.  
  
 
 
Table 3. Are there incident types that are particularly difficult to understand or use? 
 % n 
12. Resources and organization 21 12 
1. Administrative processes 18 10 
2. Clinical processes 14 8 
3. Communication and documentation 11 6 
11. Buildings and infrastructure 9 5 
Many participants find it difficult to distinguish 1.Administrative processes from 2.Clinical processes, in 
particular if the administrative process concerns a clinical one. And if both types are relevant, it may be 
difficult to remember indicating all relevant processes. There was confusion with the administrative process 
Handovers…, and its overlap with 3.Communication…, since handover incidents often involve problems 
with communication. There were also general problems with distinguishing 3.Communication… from other 
incident types, since communication problems can occur in most processes – and several raters requested 
subtypes for 3.Communication… Many found it difficult to distinguish between the three first processes in 
2.Clinical processes, in particular between Screening… and Assessment… Finally, 12.Resources and 
Organisation was found to be applicable in most cases, and thus also in need of specification and/or 
restriction. 
Many comments also concerned general issues not related to specific types. Several raters (13 comments) 
were concerned about using several incident types for a particular case and suggested either a limitation on 
the number, or a prioritization among the incident types select. There was also discomfort with the lack of 
distinction between incident and causal factor. A condensation of the comments is presented in Table 4. 
6 DISCUSSION 
6.1 Failures and causes 
Several raters complain that the ICPS-DK has no distinction between failures and causes of failures, as 
provided in the original ICPS and by most medical error taxonomies [9].  
When considering the possible benefits of a separate class for causes one should bear in mind that incident 
reports often describe one or more chains of multiple failures, where some failures are causes of others, e.g. 
the wrong setup of an infusion pump (5.Medical equipment) resulting in administration of a wrong dose 
(4.Medication). In this case, the distinction between incident type and causal factor is arbitrary and depends 
on the focus of the particular report or investigation [2], since the same failure may become a background 
factor in one scenario and a foreground factor in another. 
There are two benefits from implementing a separate class for contributing factors as provided by the 
original ICPS. First, such classification emphasizes the causal relations between different failures in a 
particular report by focusing on one failure and classifying others as its causes – thus refining the analysis of 
that report. Second, the Contributing factors class also includes further – and significant – elements that “can 
not be incidents in their own right” [2]: standing conditions [9] or systemic causes, e.g. when the wrong 
setup of the infusion is due to an inadequate user interface - conditions that may produce several failures and 
therefore are associated with potential for intervention and learning.  
Concerning the first benefit, the advantage of a focused and structural analysis of a particular report is 
achieved at the cost of its availability for so-called aggregate analysis of several reports describing similar 
failures, which will be mentioned as incident in one report and as cause in another. In the ICPS, an 
organizational phenomenon, e.g. a problem with procedures or with team organization can either be 
categorized as an incident (Resources/Organizational Management) or as a contributing factor 
(Organizational/Service Factors) [2]. The choice will largely depend on the focus chosen for the immediate 
  
 
 
investigation of the reported incident, and failures classified as causes will not be available for retrieval for 
analyses with another focus.  
Table 4. Problems and suggestions from the comments. 
 Problems Suggestions 
1.
 A
dm
in
. p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
Overlaps with Clinical processes, e.g. when 
- patient already involved 
- adm. process concerns a clinical process (e.g. ordering medicine 
or materials) 
Difficult to remember all relevant subtypes for a case 
Overlaps with Communication… 
Handovers…  
- Difficult to distinguish from Communication and Resources… 
- Does it only include shift across sectors and institutions? 
Continuity gap: 
- Also relevant for other incident types, e.g. Clinical processes 
- Overlaps with Handovers… 
- Overlaps with Communication 
Documentation 
should belong here 
Prolonged stay at 
hospital 
Staff waiting for 
staff 
Admission should 
include outpatients 
2.
 C
lin
. P
ro
ce
ss
es
 
How to classify surgical incidents? 
Difficult to distinguish first four subtypes 
Screening… overlaps with Assesment… 
How to classify observation, surveillance? 
Confusion about Test… 
Expect blood tests to belong to Blood… 
Are X-ray images included in Test? 
No subtype for absconding? 
- Not covered by ‘Detention…’ 
Continuity gap also 
belongs here 
Test… should be 
Administrative 
process 
3.
 H
C
 c
om
m
. a
nd
 d
oc
. Very broad category 
Does Health care IT belong here? 
What about technical problems with comm. tech.? 
Subtypes, e.g. 
verbal comm. 
Doc. should be 
subtype for other 
incident types 
Doc. should be an 
‘Administrative 
process’ 
12
. R
es
. 
an
d 
or
g.
 Very broad category 
Difficult to determine as contributing factor 
Sharper definition 
Subtypes, e.g. 
Protocols etc. 
G
en
er
al
 
Classification based on incidents or causes? 
Too many types for one incident report: meaningless 
Based on systemic 
models 
Max. number of 
types for one case 
Prioritization of 
types for one case 
On the other hand, if a ‘background’ failure in one report is also classified as an incident (rather than as a 
factor), the report can also be retrieved when someone decides to focus an aggregate analysis on that type of 
  
 
 
incidents – thus moving it to the ‘foreground’ of an analysis. Classifying all failures described in a given 
incident report as incident types will thus make the database more useful for aggregate analysis. This should 
enable more flexible safety management based approaches to incident analysis used in industrial safety 
analysis and often represented by the bow-tie model [11;12]. 
Concerning the second benefit of a separate class for causes, it is worth noticing that the inclusion of 
standing conditions requires an ambiguous or dualistic definition of Contributing factors, as also indicated 
by WHO: “a circumstance, action or influence” [2]. This duality is particularly evident in the dual 
representation of organizational phenomena in ICPS, since the corresponding category for contributing 
factors is intended to cover both ‘background’ organizational incidents and standing conditions.  ICPS-DK 
has omitted a separate class for contributing factors to avoid this duality and simplify classification, although 
the duality is now represented within some of the incident types that also represent standing conditions. 
6.2 High prevalence of ambiguous incident types 
However, this redefinition – expansion of several incident types to include systemic causes – creates another 
problem for the use of ICPS: the extensive use of the two types 12.Resources and Organization and 
3.Healthcare Communication and Documentation as evident in the comments and confirmed as high 
prevalence in the reliability test [13]. With high prevalence these types become non-informative, and the 
database will lose its potential, both for statistical purposes and as a vehicle for retrieval of incidents for 
aggregate analyses. These types are often chosen, both because they represent ‘background’ incidents that 
are often involved in other types of incidents with more direct (potential) effect on a patient, and because the 
characteristics of standing conditions make them difficult to identify directly, relying instead of 
interpretation sometimes bordering on pure speculation. Risk managers are trained to look for root causes 
[14], and they may want to compensate for the individual perspective of the original reporter, typically a 
healthcare professional with limited attention to organizational factors. 
6.3 Speculative causes 
Some examples will illustrate how raters sometimes go beyond the literal contents of reports and infer 
problems with, e.g., resources, procedures, staffing –  ceding to the temptation described on participant to 
“classify based on her knowledge of the case or of her organization”, and thus going beyond the requirement 
not classify according to speculation.  
For instance, a reporter will focus on specific and individual aspects and may fail to mention organizational 
factors that seem obvious to the rater. In one of the test incidents the reporter states that he must remind 
himself to ignore interruptions. However, several raters identify interruptions as an organizational problem – 
requiring organizational measures to control or reduce them.  
Similarly, problems with individual competences (a human or individual factor) may be interpreted as 
organizational problems with training and introduction (organizational factor). A case of faulty operation of 
equipment inspires a rater to indicate organizational problems (guidelines, training). A case involving a 
mistake by a temporary nurse prompts a rater to use 12.Resources and organization to indicate 
organizational problems with competences, introduction and guidelines. Another incident which was 
described as caused by “inadequate understanding of the situation” induces one rater to associate ‘inadequate 
understanding’ (a human factor) with ‘inadequate training’ (an organizational factor). 
6.4 Speculation reserved for further analysis 
These examples suggest that speculative interpretation of causes is motivated by the prospect of 
organizational learning by lifting the focus from individual human factors at the sharp end [10] to 
organizational factors with a potential for improvement, and by a need to compensate for the well known 
lack of information about systemic causes in incident reports [9] – possibly due to the limited perspective of 
a reporter less attentive to organizational factors when writing the report. 
  
 
 
Although some interpretation beyond the literal content may be necessary, and a total ban against speculation 
may constitute a barrier to organizational learning, such classification based on insufficient information will 
generally lead to invalid conclusions and flood the reporting system with pleas for premature organizational 
changes [15]. We therefore maintain our recommendation that speculations should be avoided, and 
classification of a single report based on its literal content, while further interpretation and identification of 
organizational causes may arise, either from focused analysis of individual cases based on additional 
information, or from aggregate analyses of several similar incidents. 
This recommendation, however, may not in reduce the prevalence sufficiently for the type 12.Resources and 
Organization, and the addition of mandatory subtypes will elicit more useful information from raters and 
prompt them to be more specific. 
7 CHANGES TO ICPS-DK BASED ON THE COMMENTS 
There were two changes of subtypes (processes) under 1.Administrative processes. First, the generic process 
Care flow/patient flow was introduced, replacing the separate category for Waiting list..., making it possible 
to indicate problems with waiting time and continuity gap – which may be specified if going beyond 
mandatory reporting to make an optional  indication of problem: ‘Not executed at the right 
time/postponement’. Second, the subtype Response to emergency, included in ICPS but not in the Danish test 
version, was now added. 
In 2.Clinical processes, two subtypes were modified. Test… was changed into Interpretation of and reaction 
to examinations and tests, while examples in the user guide still include problems with delayed or confused 
specimens.  The subtype Detention/restraint was changed into Forced physical or medical treatment in order 
to also include forced medication. 
The incident type 3.Healthcare communication and documentation was modified by including four optional 
subtypes. The rater can thus indicate 1) Type of communication (oral, electronic or paper) 2) ‘Between 
whom’, e.g. to indicate whether a healthcare professional has communicated with a patient or another 
professional, 3) type of document (electronic or paper), and 4) Problem. 
Finally, 12.Resources and organization was changed into Individual, team and organization to include a 
wider and specified range of human and organizational factors, which can be indicated as optional subtypes. 
With this expansion, this incident type will also capture reports where, e.g., only human factors such as 
competences are mentioned.  
8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
The raters participating in this study have not been trained in using the ICPS-DK although most had 
experience from the previous and much simpler reporting system classification. 
Some of the raters’ comments about lack of details may reflect the fact that they had access to only the 
mandatory incident types (Table 1) and their definitions.  
Due to the focus of the study and the questionnaire design, comments are mainly directed at problems with 
the classification rather than positive aspects of usability. Nevertheless, a few participants did comment on 
ICPS-DK being easier to use than the first version of the Danish reporting system. 
The case-mix used was selected to cover all the incident types and subtypes, and a random sample of cases 
might be thought to possibly have challenged the completeness of ICPS-DK by revealing a greater need for 
new and additional incident types. Yet this does not seem very likely as each case was assigned to several 
more incident types than the one type the case was selected to cover. Hence, the casemix is not restricted to 
the selection criteria. 
  
 
 
9 CONCLUSION 
Half of the respondents found ICPS-DK fairly easy to use and only 5% found it difficult. This is promising, 
because ICPS-DK is much more comprehensive than the classification used in the previous reporting system, 
and moreover, a third of the respondents had no prior experience with classifying events, and none were 
familiar with this new classification.  
The incident types and subtypes of the mandatory version of ICPS-DK were found to be exhaustive for the 
classification of the broad case-mix used. 
However, the usability revealed some challenges with some elements of the basic ICPS framework, as well 
as challenges with the Danish adaptation. There is some confusion over the use of non-exclusive categories – 
a challenge inherent in the ICPS, although further aggravated with the lack of a separate class for 
contributing factors in the Danish adaptation. There is also some confusion over: the distinction between 
clinical and administrative processes, especially for processes directly involving a patient; the classification 
of handovers and continuity gaps; the distinction between the first clinical processes (subtypes); the separate 
classification of documentation incidents since these are regarded as belonging to a specific process; 
classification of IT problems; classification of surgical incidents; classification of incidents involving test 
results, especially lab tests. 
Some of the main challenges related to the Danish adaptation concern the lack of a class for contributing 
factors, which instead are represented by allowing the use of several types and by expanding the definition of 
two incident types to include latent conditions.  
The usability study reveals one inconvenience of this approach: The two incident types that are also used to 
indicate latent conditions – 12.Resources and Organization and 3.Communication and Documentation – may 
be used for a large proportion of cases, especially if raters are keen to look for systemic causes. In this case, 
when categorization into these types makes them highly prevalent, as documented in a parallel paper [7], 
they become non-informative.  Furthermore, 3. Communication and Documentation generally overlaps with 
several other incident types, since many incidents somehow involve communication problems. 
The most promising and efficient way of reducing this problem seems to be for raters to follow a 
recommendation to be specific and thus use subtypes and to avoid speculation beyond what is written in the 
report. 
10 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the Danish Regions (DR), Local Government Denmark (LGD), Danish 
Cancer Society (DCS), Association of Danish Pharmacies (ADP), Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA), 
National Institute of Radiation Protection (NIRP), Danish Society for Patient Safety (DSPS), Technical 
University of Denmark (DTU) and Danish National Board of Health (DNBH) for their continuing assistance 
in this initiative. The authors also wish to thank Jørgen Hansen (NBH), Karin Povlsen (NBH), Camilla 
Wiberg Danielsen (NBH), Inger Margrete D. Siemsen (DTU), Anamarie Søgård (DR), Inge Pedersen (DR), 
Martin Bommersholt (DR), Helle Strange Tobiasen (DR), Anne Munk Kristiansen (DR), Jens Kjær-
Rasmussen (DR) Henriette Benedicte Honoré (DR), Charlotte Mortensen (DKMA), Marie Melsekens 
(DKMA), Britta Højgaard (NIRP), Malene Vestergård (DSPS), Henriette Lipczak (DCS), Mette Gram-
Hansen (ADP), and Margit Kure Ulriksen (LGD) who served as members of the Patient Safety Classification 
Workgroup. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the policies of 
the Danish National Board of Health 
11 REFERENCES 
 1  Sundhedsstyrelsen. Årsrapport 2010 - DPSD.: Sundhedsstyrelsen; 2011 Feb.  
  
 
 
 2  World Health Organization. World Alliance for Patient Safety. The Conceptual Framework for the 
International Classification for Patient Safety (v1.1). Final Technical Report. 
(http://www.who.int/entity/patientsafety/taxonomy/icps_full_report.pdf) : WHO; 2009 Jan.  
 3  The World Alliance For Patient Safety Drafting Group, Sherman H, Castro G, Fletcher M, on behalf of 
The World Alliance for Patient Safety, Hatlie M, et al. Towards an International Classification for 
Patient Safety: the conceptual framework. Int J Qual Health Care 2009 Feb 1;21(1):2-8. 
 4  Thomson R, Lewalle P, Sherman H, Hibbert P, Runciman W, Castro G. Towards an International 
Classification for Patient Safety: a Delphi survey. Int J Qual Health Care 2009 Feb 1;21(1):9-17. 
 5  Runciman W, Hibbert P, Thomson R, Van Der Schaaf T, Sherman H, Lewalle P. Towards an 
International Classification for Patient Safety: key concepts and terms. Int J Qual Health Care 2009 
Feb 1;21(1):18-26. 
 6  Sundhedsstyrelsen. Årsrapport 2010 - DPSD.: Sundhedsstyrelsen; 2011 Feb.  
 7  Mikkelsen KL, Thommesen J, Andersen HB. Validating the ICPS-based classification of patient safety 
incidents in Denmark [forthcoming]. Int J Qual Health Care 2012. 
 8  World Alliance for Patient Safety. WHO Draft Guidelines for Adverse Event Reporting and Learning 
Systems.Geneva, Switzerland: WHO; 2005.  
 9  Taib IA, McIntosh AS, Caponecchia C, Baysari MT. A review of medical error taxonomies: A human 
factors perspective. Safety Science 2011;49(5):607-15. 
 10  Reason J. Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate; 1997. 
 11  Ale BJM, Baksteen H, Bellamy LJ, Bloemhof A, Goossens L, Hale A, et al. Quantifying occupational 
risk: The development of an occupational risk model. Safety Science 2008;46(2):176-85. 
 12  Duijm NJ, Goossens L. Quantifying the influence of safety management on the reliability of safety 
barriers. Journal of Hazardous Materials 2006;130(3):284-92. 
 13  Mikkelsen KL, Thommesen J, Andersen HB. Validating the ICPS-based classification of patient 
adverse events in Denmark [submitted]. Int J Qual Health Care 2011. 
 14  Wu AW, Lipshutz AKM, Pronovost PJ. Effectiveness and Efficiency of Root Cause Analysis in 
Medicine. JAMA 2008;299(6). 
 15  Levitt B, March JG. Organizational Learning. Annual Review of Sociology 1988;14(22):319-40. 
 
 
